ai_v/venv/Lib/site-packages/jinja2/sandbox.py

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feat(api): 实现图像生成及后台同步功能 - 新增图像生成接口,支持试用、积分和自定义API Key模式 - 实现生成图片结果异步上传至MinIO存储,带重试机制 - 优化积分预扣除和异常退还逻辑,保障用户积分准确 - 添加获取生成历史记录接口,支持时间范围和分页 - 提供本地字典配置接口,支持模型、比例、提示模板和尺寸 - 实现图片批量上传接口,支持S3兼容对象存储 feat(admin): 增加管理员角色管理与权限分配接口 - 实现角色列表查询、角色创建、更新及删除功能 - 增加权限列表查询接口 - 实现用户角色分配接口,便于统一管理用户权限 - 增加系统字典增删查改接口,支持分类过滤和排序 - 权限控制全面覆盖管理接口,保证安全访问 feat(auth): 完善用户登录注册及权限相关接口与页面 - 实现手机号验证码发送及校验功能,保障注册安全 - 支持手机号注册、登录及退出接口,集成日志记录 - 增加修改密码功能,验证原密码后更新 - 提供动态导航菜单接口,基于权限展示不同菜单 - 实现管理界面路由及日志、角色、字典管理页面访问权限控制 - 添加系统日志查询接口,支持关键词和等级筛选 feat(app): 初始化Flask应用并配置蓝图与数据库 - 创建应用程序工厂,加载配置,初始化数据库和Redis客户端 - 注册认证、API及管理员蓝图,整合路由 - 根路由渲染主页模板 - 应用上下文中自动创建数据库表,保证运行环境准备完毕 feat(database): 提供数据库创建与迁移支持脚本 - 新增数据库创建脚本,支持自动检测是否已存在 - 添加数据库表初始化脚本,支持创建和删除所有表 - 实现RBAC权限初始化,包含基础权限和角色创建 - 新增字段手动修复脚本,添加用户API Key和积分字段 - 强制迁移脚本支持清理连接和修复表结构,初始化默认数据及角色分配 feat(config): 新增系统配置参数 - 配置数据库、Redis、Session和MinIO相关参数 - 添加AI接口地址及试用Key配置 - 集成阿里云短信服务配置及开发模式相关参数 feat(extensions): 初始化数据库、Redis和MinIO客户端 - 创建全局SQLAlchemy数据库实例和Redis客户端 - 配置基于boto3的MinIO兼容S3客户端 chore(logs): 添加示例系统日志文件 - 记录用户请求、验证码发送成功与失败的日志信息
2026-01-12 00:53:31 +08:00
"""A sandbox layer that ensures unsafe operations cannot be performed.
Useful when the template itself comes from an untrusted source.
"""
import operator
import types
import typing as t
from _string import formatter_field_name_split # type: ignore
from collections import abc
from collections import deque
from functools import update_wrapper
from string import Formatter
from markupsafe import EscapeFormatter
from markupsafe import Markup
from .environment import Environment
from .exceptions import SecurityError
from .runtime import Context
from .runtime import Undefined
F = t.TypeVar("F", bound=t.Callable[..., t.Any])
#: maximum number of items a range may produce
MAX_RANGE = 100000
#: Unsafe function attributes.
UNSAFE_FUNCTION_ATTRIBUTES: t.Set[str] = set()
#: Unsafe method attributes. Function attributes are unsafe for methods too.
UNSAFE_METHOD_ATTRIBUTES: t.Set[str] = set()
#: unsafe generator attributes.
UNSAFE_GENERATOR_ATTRIBUTES = {"gi_frame", "gi_code"}
#: unsafe attributes on coroutines
UNSAFE_COROUTINE_ATTRIBUTES = {"cr_frame", "cr_code"}
#: unsafe attributes on async generators
UNSAFE_ASYNC_GENERATOR_ATTRIBUTES = {"ag_code", "ag_frame"}
_mutable_spec: t.Tuple[t.Tuple[t.Type[t.Any], t.FrozenSet[str]], ...] = (
(
abc.MutableSet,
frozenset(
[
"add",
"clear",
"difference_update",
"discard",
"pop",
"remove",
"symmetric_difference_update",
"update",
]
),
),
(
abc.MutableMapping,
frozenset(["clear", "pop", "popitem", "setdefault", "update"]),
),
(
abc.MutableSequence,
frozenset(
["append", "clear", "pop", "reverse", "insert", "sort", "extend", "remove"]
),
),
(
deque,
frozenset(
[
"append",
"appendleft",
"clear",
"extend",
"extendleft",
"pop",
"popleft",
"remove",
"rotate",
]
),
),
)
def safe_range(*args: int) -> range:
"""A range that can't generate ranges with a length of more than
MAX_RANGE items.
"""
rng = range(*args)
if len(rng) > MAX_RANGE:
raise OverflowError(
"Range too big. The sandbox blocks ranges larger than"
f" MAX_RANGE ({MAX_RANGE})."
)
return rng
def unsafe(f: F) -> F:
"""Marks a function or method as unsafe.
.. code-block: python
@unsafe
def delete(self):
pass
"""
f.unsafe_callable = True # type: ignore
return f
def is_internal_attribute(obj: t.Any, attr: str) -> bool:
"""Test if the attribute given is an internal python attribute. For
example this function returns `True` for the `func_code` attribute of
python objects. This is useful if the environment method
:meth:`~SandboxedEnvironment.is_safe_attribute` is overridden.
>>> from jinja2.sandbox import is_internal_attribute
>>> is_internal_attribute(str, "mro")
True
>>> is_internal_attribute(str, "upper")
False
"""
if isinstance(obj, types.FunctionType):
if attr in UNSAFE_FUNCTION_ATTRIBUTES:
return True
elif isinstance(obj, types.MethodType):
if attr in UNSAFE_FUNCTION_ATTRIBUTES or attr in UNSAFE_METHOD_ATTRIBUTES:
return True
elif isinstance(obj, type):
if attr == "mro":
return True
elif isinstance(obj, (types.CodeType, types.TracebackType, types.FrameType)):
return True
elif isinstance(obj, types.GeneratorType):
if attr in UNSAFE_GENERATOR_ATTRIBUTES:
return True
elif hasattr(types, "CoroutineType") and isinstance(obj, types.CoroutineType):
if attr in UNSAFE_COROUTINE_ATTRIBUTES:
return True
elif hasattr(types, "AsyncGeneratorType") and isinstance(
obj, types.AsyncGeneratorType
):
if attr in UNSAFE_ASYNC_GENERATOR_ATTRIBUTES:
return True
return attr.startswith("__")
def modifies_known_mutable(obj: t.Any, attr: str) -> bool:
"""This function checks if an attribute on a builtin mutable object
(list, dict, set or deque) or the corresponding ABCs would modify it
if called.
>>> modifies_known_mutable({}, "clear")
True
>>> modifies_known_mutable({}, "keys")
False
>>> modifies_known_mutable([], "append")
True
>>> modifies_known_mutable([], "index")
False
If called with an unsupported object, ``False`` is returned.
>>> modifies_known_mutable("foo", "upper")
False
"""
for typespec, unsafe in _mutable_spec:
if isinstance(obj, typespec):
return attr in unsafe
return False
class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
"""The sandboxed environment. It works like the regular environment but
tells the compiler to generate sandboxed code. Additionally subclasses of
this environment may override the methods that tell the runtime what
attributes or functions are safe to access.
If the template tries to access insecure code a :exc:`SecurityError` is
raised. However also other exceptions may occur during the rendering so
the caller has to ensure that all exceptions are caught.
"""
sandboxed = True
#: default callback table for the binary operators. A copy of this is
#: available on each instance of a sandboxed environment as
#: :attr:`binop_table`
default_binop_table: t.Dict[str, t.Callable[[t.Any, t.Any], t.Any]] = {
"+": operator.add,
"-": operator.sub,
"*": operator.mul,
"/": operator.truediv,
"//": operator.floordiv,
"**": operator.pow,
"%": operator.mod,
}
#: default callback table for the unary operators. A copy of this is
#: available on each instance of a sandboxed environment as
#: :attr:`unop_table`
default_unop_table: t.Dict[str, t.Callable[[t.Any], t.Any]] = {
"+": operator.pos,
"-": operator.neg,
}
#: a set of binary operators that should be intercepted. Each operator
#: that is added to this set (empty by default) is delegated to the
#: :meth:`call_binop` method that will perform the operator. The default
#: operator callback is specified by :attr:`binop_table`.
#:
#: The following binary operators are interceptable:
#: ``//``, ``%``, ``+``, ``*``, ``-``, ``/``, and ``**``
#:
#: The default operation form the operator table corresponds to the
#: builtin function. Intercepted calls are always slower than the native
#: operator call, so make sure only to intercept the ones you are
#: interested in.
#:
#: .. versionadded:: 2.6
intercepted_binops: t.FrozenSet[str] = frozenset()
#: a set of unary operators that should be intercepted. Each operator
#: that is added to this set (empty by default) is delegated to the
#: :meth:`call_unop` method that will perform the operator. The default
#: operator callback is specified by :attr:`unop_table`.
#:
#: The following unary operators are interceptable: ``+``, ``-``
#:
#: The default operation form the operator table corresponds to the
#: builtin function. Intercepted calls are always slower than the native
#: operator call, so make sure only to intercept the ones you are
#: interested in.
#:
#: .. versionadded:: 2.6
intercepted_unops: t.FrozenSet[str] = frozenset()
def __init__(self, *args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> None:
super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
self.globals["range"] = safe_range
self.binop_table = self.default_binop_table.copy()
self.unop_table = self.default_unop_table.copy()
def is_safe_attribute(self, obj: t.Any, attr: str, value: t.Any) -> bool:
"""The sandboxed environment will call this method to check if the
attribute of an object is safe to access. Per default all attributes
starting with an underscore are considered private as well as the
special attributes of internal python objects as returned by the
:func:`is_internal_attribute` function.
"""
return not (attr.startswith("_") or is_internal_attribute(obj, attr))
def is_safe_callable(self, obj: t.Any) -> bool:
"""Check if an object is safely callable. By default callables
are considered safe unless decorated with :func:`unsafe`.
This also recognizes the Django convention of setting
``func.alters_data = True``.
"""
return not (
getattr(obj, "unsafe_callable", False) or getattr(obj, "alters_data", False)
)
def call_binop(
self, context: Context, operator: str, left: t.Any, right: t.Any
) -> t.Any:
"""For intercepted binary operator calls (:meth:`intercepted_binops`)
this function is executed instead of the builtin operator. This can
be used to fine tune the behavior of certain operators.
.. versionadded:: 2.6
"""
return self.binop_table[operator](left, right)
def call_unop(self, context: Context, operator: str, arg: t.Any) -> t.Any:
"""For intercepted unary operator calls (:meth:`intercepted_unops`)
this function is executed instead of the builtin operator. This can
be used to fine tune the behavior of certain operators.
.. versionadded:: 2.6
"""
return self.unop_table[operator](arg)
def getitem(
self, obj: t.Any, argument: t.Union[str, t.Any]
) -> t.Union[t.Any, Undefined]:
"""Subscribe an object from sandboxed code."""
try:
return obj[argument]
except (TypeError, LookupError):
if isinstance(argument, str):
try:
attr = str(argument)
except Exception:
pass
else:
try:
value = getattr(obj, attr)
except AttributeError:
pass
else:
fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
if fmt is not None:
return fmt
if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, argument, value):
return value
return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, argument)
return self.undefined(obj=obj, name=argument)
def getattr(self, obj: t.Any, attribute: str) -> t.Union[t.Any, Undefined]:
"""Subscribe an object from sandboxed code and prefer the
attribute. The attribute passed *must* be a bytestring.
"""
try:
value = getattr(obj, attribute)
except AttributeError:
try:
return obj[attribute]
except (TypeError, LookupError):
pass
else:
fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
if fmt is not None:
return fmt
if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, attribute, value):
return value
return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, attribute)
return self.undefined(obj=obj, name=attribute)
def unsafe_undefined(self, obj: t.Any, attribute: str) -> Undefined:
"""Return an undefined object for unsafe attributes."""
return self.undefined(
f"access to attribute {attribute!r} of"
f" {type(obj).__name__!r} object is unsafe.",
name=attribute,
obj=obj,
exc=SecurityError,
)
def wrap_str_format(self, value: t.Any) -> t.Optional[t.Callable[..., str]]:
"""If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
also sandboxed.
"""
if not isinstance(
value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
return None
f_self: t.Any = value.__self__
if not isinstance(f_self, str):
return None
str_type: t.Type[str] = type(f_self)
is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
formatter: SandboxedFormatter
if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
else:
formatter = SandboxedFormatter(self)
vformat = formatter.vformat
def wrapper(*args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> str:
if is_format_map:
if kwargs:
raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
if len(args) != 1:
raise TypeError(
f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
)
kwargs = args[0]
args = ()
return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
def call(
__self, # noqa: B902
__context: Context,
__obj: t.Any,
*args: t.Any,
**kwargs: t.Any,
) -> t.Any:
"""Call an object from sandboxed code."""
# the double prefixes are to avoid double keyword argument
# errors when proxying the call.
if not __self.is_safe_callable(__obj):
raise SecurityError(f"{__obj!r} is not safely callable")
return __context.call(__obj, *args, **kwargs)
class ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment(SandboxedEnvironment):
"""Works exactly like the regular `SandboxedEnvironment` but does not
permit modifications on the builtin mutable objects `list`, `set`, and
`dict` by using the :func:`modifies_known_mutable` function.
"""
def is_safe_attribute(self, obj: t.Any, attr: str, value: t.Any) -> bool:
if not super().is_safe_attribute(obj, attr, value):
return False
return not modifies_known_mutable(obj, attr)
class SandboxedFormatter(Formatter):
def __init__(self, env: Environment, **kwargs: t.Any) -> None:
self._env = env
super().__init__(**kwargs)
def get_field(
self, field_name: str, args: t.Sequence[t.Any], kwargs: t.Mapping[str, t.Any]
) -> t.Tuple[t.Any, str]:
first, rest = formatter_field_name_split(field_name)
obj = self.get_value(first, args, kwargs)
for is_attr, i in rest:
if is_attr:
obj = self._env.getattr(obj, i)
else:
obj = self._env.getitem(obj, i)
return obj, first
class SandboxedEscapeFormatter(SandboxedFormatter, EscapeFormatter):
pass