ai_v/venv/Lib/site-packages/cryptography/hazmat/primitives/keywrap.py
24024 af7c11d7f9 feat(api): 实现图像生成及后台同步功能
- 新增图像生成接口,支持试用、积分和自定义API Key模式
- 实现生成图片结果异步上传至MinIO存储,带重试机制
- 优化积分预扣除和异常退还逻辑,保障用户积分准确
- 添加获取生成历史记录接口,支持时间范围和分页
- 提供本地字典配置接口,支持模型、比例、提示模板和尺寸
- 实现图片批量上传接口,支持S3兼容对象存储

feat(admin): 增加管理员角色管理与权限分配接口

- 实现角色列表查询、角色创建、更新及删除功能
- 增加权限列表查询接口
- 实现用户角色分配接口,便于统一管理用户权限
- 增加系统字典增删查改接口,支持分类过滤和排序
- 权限控制全面覆盖管理接口,保证安全访问

feat(auth): 完善用户登录注册及权限相关接口与页面

- 实现手机号验证码发送及校验功能,保障注册安全
- 支持手机号注册、登录及退出接口,集成日志记录
- 增加修改密码功能,验证原密码后更新
- 提供动态导航菜单接口,基于权限展示不同菜单
- 实现管理界面路由及日志、角色、字典管理页面访问权限控制
- 添加系统日志查询接口,支持关键词和等级筛选

feat(app): 初始化Flask应用并配置蓝图与数据库

- 创建应用程序工厂,加载配置,初始化数据库和Redis客户端
- 注册认证、API及管理员蓝图,整合路由
- 根路由渲染主页模板
- 应用上下文中自动创建数据库表,保证运行环境准备完毕

feat(database): 提供数据库创建与迁移支持脚本

- 新增数据库创建脚本,支持自动检测是否已存在
- 添加数据库表初始化脚本,支持创建和删除所有表
- 实现RBAC权限初始化,包含基础权限和角色创建
- 新增字段手动修复脚本,添加用户API Key和积分字段
- 强制迁移脚本支持清理连接和修复表结构,初始化默认数据及角色分配

feat(config): 新增系统配置参数

- 配置数据库、Redis、Session和MinIO相关参数
- 添加AI接口地址及试用Key配置
- 集成阿里云短信服务配置及开发模式相关参数

feat(extensions): 初始化数据库、Redis和MinIO客户端

- 创建全局SQLAlchemy数据库实例和Redis客户端
- 配置基于boto3的MinIO兼容S3客户端

chore(logs): 添加示例系统日志文件

- 记录用户请求、验证码发送成功与失败的日志信息
2026-01-12 00:53:31 +08:00

178 lines
5.5 KiB
Python

# This file is dual licensed under the terms of the Apache License, Version
# 2.0, and the BSD License. See the LICENSE file in the root of this repository
# for complete details.
from __future__ import annotations
import typing
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.algorithms import AES
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.modes import ECB
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.constant_time import bytes_eq
def _wrap_core(
wrapping_key: bytes,
a: bytes,
r: list[bytes],
) -> bytes:
# RFC 3394 Key Wrap - 2.2.1 (index method)
encryptor = Cipher(AES(wrapping_key), ECB()).encryptor()
n = len(r)
for j in range(6):
for i in range(n):
# every encryption operation is a discrete 16 byte chunk (because
# AES has a 128-bit block size) and since we're using ECB it is
# safe to reuse the encryptor for the entire operation
b = encryptor.update(a + r[i])
a = (
int.from_bytes(b[:8], byteorder="big") ^ ((n * j) + i + 1)
).to_bytes(length=8, byteorder="big")
r[i] = b[-8:]
assert encryptor.finalize() == b""
return a + b"".join(r)
def aes_key_wrap(
wrapping_key: bytes,
key_to_wrap: bytes,
backend: typing.Any = None,
) -> bytes:
if len(wrapping_key) not in [16, 24, 32]:
raise ValueError("The wrapping key must be a valid AES key length")
if len(key_to_wrap) < 16:
raise ValueError("The key to wrap must be at least 16 bytes")
if len(key_to_wrap) % 8 != 0:
raise ValueError("The key to wrap must be a multiple of 8 bytes")
a = b"\xa6\xa6\xa6\xa6\xa6\xa6\xa6\xa6"
r = [key_to_wrap[i : i + 8] for i in range(0, len(key_to_wrap), 8)]
return _wrap_core(wrapping_key, a, r)
def _unwrap_core(
wrapping_key: bytes,
a: bytes,
r: list[bytes],
) -> tuple[bytes, list[bytes]]:
# Implement RFC 3394 Key Unwrap - 2.2.2 (index method)
decryptor = Cipher(AES(wrapping_key), ECB()).decryptor()
n = len(r)
for j in reversed(range(6)):
for i in reversed(range(n)):
atr = (
int.from_bytes(a, byteorder="big") ^ ((n * j) + i + 1)
).to_bytes(length=8, byteorder="big") + r[i]
# every decryption operation is a discrete 16 byte chunk so
# it is safe to reuse the decryptor for the entire operation
b = decryptor.update(atr)
a = b[:8]
r[i] = b[-8:]
assert decryptor.finalize() == b""
return a, r
def aes_key_wrap_with_padding(
wrapping_key: bytes,
key_to_wrap: bytes,
backend: typing.Any = None,
) -> bytes:
if len(wrapping_key) not in [16, 24, 32]:
raise ValueError("The wrapping key must be a valid AES key length")
aiv = b"\xa6\x59\x59\xa6" + len(key_to_wrap).to_bytes(
length=4, byteorder="big"
)
# pad the key to wrap if necessary
pad = (8 - (len(key_to_wrap) % 8)) % 8
key_to_wrap = key_to_wrap + b"\x00" * pad
if len(key_to_wrap) == 8:
# RFC 5649 - 4.1 - exactly 8 octets after padding
encryptor = Cipher(AES(wrapping_key), ECB()).encryptor()
b = encryptor.update(aiv + key_to_wrap)
assert encryptor.finalize() == b""
return b
else:
r = [key_to_wrap[i : i + 8] for i in range(0, len(key_to_wrap), 8)]
return _wrap_core(wrapping_key, aiv, r)
def aes_key_unwrap_with_padding(
wrapping_key: bytes,
wrapped_key: bytes,
backend: typing.Any = None,
) -> bytes:
if len(wrapped_key) < 16:
raise InvalidUnwrap("Must be at least 16 bytes")
if len(wrapping_key) not in [16, 24, 32]:
raise ValueError("The wrapping key must be a valid AES key length")
if len(wrapped_key) == 16:
# RFC 5649 - 4.2 - exactly two 64-bit blocks
decryptor = Cipher(AES(wrapping_key), ECB()).decryptor()
out = decryptor.update(wrapped_key)
assert decryptor.finalize() == b""
a = out[:8]
data = out[8:]
n = 1
else:
r = [wrapped_key[i : i + 8] for i in range(0, len(wrapped_key), 8)]
encrypted_aiv = r.pop(0)
n = len(r)
a, r = _unwrap_core(wrapping_key, encrypted_aiv, r)
data = b"".join(r)
# 1) Check that MSB(32,A) = A65959A6.
# 2) Check that 8*(n-1) < LSB(32,A) <= 8*n. If so, let
# MLI = LSB(32,A).
# 3) Let b = (8*n)-MLI, and then check that the rightmost b octets of
# the output data are zero.
mli = int.from_bytes(a[4:], byteorder="big")
b = (8 * n) - mli
if (
not bytes_eq(a[:4], b"\xa6\x59\x59\xa6")
or not 8 * (n - 1) < mli <= 8 * n
or (b != 0 and not bytes_eq(data[-b:], b"\x00" * b))
):
raise InvalidUnwrap()
if b == 0:
return data
else:
return data[:-b]
def aes_key_unwrap(
wrapping_key: bytes,
wrapped_key: bytes,
backend: typing.Any = None,
) -> bytes:
if len(wrapped_key) < 24:
raise InvalidUnwrap("Must be at least 24 bytes")
if len(wrapped_key) % 8 != 0:
raise InvalidUnwrap("The wrapped key must be a multiple of 8 bytes")
if len(wrapping_key) not in [16, 24, 32]:
raise ValueError("The wrapping key must be a valid AES key length")
aiv = b"\xa6\xa6\xa6\xa6\xa6\xa6\xa6\xa6"
r = [wrapped_key[i : i + 8] for i in range(0, len(wrapped_key), 8)]
a = r.pop(0)
a, r = _unwrap_core(wrapping_key, a, r)
if not bytes_eq(a, aiv):
raise InvalidUnwrap()
return b"".join(r)
class InvalidUnwrap(Exception):
pass